





reality Check: On the Solvability of the 



































on,	 in	 particular	 to	 professors	Miščević	 and	
Devitt,	 to	 John	 Collins	 who	 pointed	 out	 a	
mistake	I	had	made,	to	Gurpreet	Rattan	who	
explained	to	me	exactly	what	John	meant,	and	











































































2. realism vs. Constructivism








sion?	Perhaps	some	aliens	have	abducted	you	and	 inserted	a	 red	 filter	 into	
your	visual	system,	and	later	they	erased	your	memory	of	the	whole	incident;	
you are not in a position to perform surgery on yourself in order to find out. 





We	could	 take	 the	 example,	 the	metaphor,	 a	 bit	 further.	What	 if	 you	were	
to	exit	the	room	somehow	(you	managed	to	escape	your	captors!)?	If	upon	
exiting	you	should	encounter	a	multi-coloured	world,	this	would	prove	that	











mething	 objectively	 exists	 independently	 of	
the	 mental.	Yet,	 since	 it	 is	 compatible	 with	
(and  actually  part  of)  this  doctrine  that  the 


















–	we	cannot	“exit”	 reality	 in	order	 to	examine	“the	outside”	 (some	people	



































First	 of	 all,	 his	 central	 aprioristic	 claim	 rests	 on	 extremely	 controversial	
ground.	The	major	premiss	of	the	argument	is	this:












It	 is	not	my	 intention	 to	discuss	 this	exceptionally	 far-reaching	and	conse-
quence-loaded	latter	claim	within	the	confines	of	this	paper.	I	would	just	like	






tantly	 incoherent	 (this	 is	 also	 pointed	 out	 by	Devitt,	 cf.	Devitt	&	Sterelny	
1999:	250,	Devitt	2006a:	7,	and	was	first	noted	by	Jacobi).	Causality	is,	ac-
cording	to	Kant,	one	of	the	concepts	of	pure	understanding,	which	serves	as	






both	 that	 causality	 applies	 and	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 things-in-themselves.	Of	
course,	Kant	 could,	 like	 the	German	 Idealists	 after	 him,	 dispense	with	 the	
things-in-themselves	altogether;	but	then,	as	he	himself	puts	it,	there	would	
be nothing in the appearances that appears.	Then	again,	if	the	things-in-them-
selves are	 retained,	 I	 agree	with	Devitt	 that	 they	are	explanatorily	useless,	
since their role as constraints on our theorizing is made completely ineffective 
by	Kant’s	view	that	we	can	know	nothing	about	them	whatsoever.	I	conclude	
that	Kant’s	position	–	 powerful,	 complex	and	 influential	 as	 it	may	be	–  is 
untenable.
2.2.2.	The	Weaknesses	of	Worlds:	Goodman













not	 make	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	
them	 in	 the	 context	 of	 this	 article.	Cf.	Abel	
(2004:	25)	for	discussion.
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Let’s	 consider	Goodman’s	 argument	 back	 to	 front.	 Its	 problem	 lies	 not	 in	
the	logical	relations	between	the	premisses	and	the	conclusion;	there	isn’t	a	
non-seqitur	here.6 It lies rather in the premisses and conclusion as individual 
















































1. realism is a compelling doctrine and it is universally held (outside in-
tellectual/philosophical circles); it is central to our whole way of viewing 

















Devitt	 seems	 particularly	 suspicious	 of	 intellectual/philosophical	 circles	
(“Antirealism	about	the	physical	world	is	an	occupational	hasard	of	philoso-
phy”,	1999:	1).	I	am	suspicious	of	this	suspicion.
2. realism (about ordinary objects) is confirmed day by day in our expe-












3. realism is the core of common sense (1984: 47; 1999: 9; 2006a: 6).
It	might	be	my	partly	continental	education,	but	I	am	quite	suspicious	towards	
common	sense.	Common	sense	is	both	non-universal	and	doubtful.	It	is	non-
universal,	 since	 it	 seems	quite	obvious	 that	 some	 (presently	 existing)	 tribe	
6
It	has	actually	been	called	into	question	–	du-








every	 such	description	 is	 a	world	and	every	
world	is	nothing	but	a	description.	It	follows	
that if there is indeed a multitude of mutually 

















4. It would be crazy to claim otherwise (Devitt & Sterelny 1999: 250; 
Devitt 2006a: 8).
Devitt	says	that	it	would	be	crazy	to	claim,	contrary	to	Realism,	that	there	would	





5. we should “put metaphysics first”, embrace naturalism and reject 
anti-realist arguments starting from epistemology or semantics (1999: 
12–14; 2006a: 9–11; also Devitt & Sterelny 1999: 233–235, 241–244).
Devitt	 sees	 Kant	 as	 proceeding	 from	 a	 priori	 considerations	 about	 what	
knowledge	must	be	like	to	conclusions	about	what	the	world	must	be	like.	In	
a	more	contemporary	form,	in	Dummett	and	Putnam8	for	example,	the	argu-



















































that	 needn’t	 have	 immediate	metaphysical	 consequences.	The	 first	 part	 of	
the	book,	however,	is	very	much	metaphysical,	though	this	isn’t	admitted	by	
Boghossian.	It	has	to	do	with	the	construction	of	facts.





















verificationism  and  implicit  behaviourism 
and	 positivism	 (cf.	 especially	 Devitt	 1984:	









style	 autoreferentiality	 blocking	with	 regard	
to	these	theories	(cf.	Dummett	1992);	howe-











describing	 that	 region	–	and	we	can	 reshuffle	 the	 sentences/propositions	 to	
get	a	different	set	of	facts.	Facts	can	be	nothing	other	than	linguistic/cognitive	






































































and	 Idealism,	as	he	 terms	 them)	are	cognitively	meaningless,	since neither 
one	can	be	 tested	by	science,	 that	 is,	by	experience.	Whichever	position	 is	
assumed,	this	in	no	way	adds	to	our	empirical	claims,	the	only	ones	that	are	























Since “to be  real  in  the  scientific  sense me-
ans to be an element of the system; hence this 
concept  cannot  be  meaningfully  applied  to 
the	system	itself”	(73).
14
A  more  recent  interpretation  of  the  dispute 
as	 semantic	 comes	 from	 Dummett	 (1978).	













that	 it	 is	ultimately	a	matter	of	choice	whether	we	are	 realists	or	construc-
tivists;	nevertheless,	it	is	not	a	choice	between	languages,	since	it	has	been	

























































O rješivosti spora između realizma 
i konstruktivizma u ontologiji
Sažetak
U uvodu članak predstavlja, na temelju djela Michaela Devitta, sukobljene ontološke pozicije, 
realizam	i	konstruktivizam.	Prvi	insistira	na	nezavisnosti	prirode	svijeta	od	našeg	pojmovnog	
aparata,	jezika	ili	znanstvenih	teorija,	dok	drugi	tvrdi	da	takva	zavisnost	postoji.	Središnji	dio	
članka teži pokazati kako je spor između realizma i konstruktivizma nerješiv, i to pomoću misao-
nog	eksperimenta	na	koji	se	nadostavlja	pobijanje	argumenata	središnjih	konstruktivista	(Kant,	
Goodman) i realista (Devitt, Boghossian). Također se ukratko razmatraju, te odbacuju, gledišta 
Hilaryja Putnama. U zaključku se tvrdi, pozivajući se djelomice na Carnapova shvaćanja, da se 
spor ne može razriješiti, da se radi o svojevrsnoj kantovskoj antinomiji, te da je biti realistom 





Obviously,	 the	 choice	 or	 decision	 in	 questi-
on is not one that is made on the basis of the 
apparent	truth	of	one	of	the	two	positions	(co-








Compare	 the	 Devitt-Busch	 polemic	 in	 the	
Croatian	 Journal	 of	 Philosophy	 (Devitt 

















Über die Lösbarkeit des realismus-/ 















Realismus,	 Konstruktivismus,	Welterzeugung,	 Realität,	 Lösbarkeit,	 Ontologie,	 Semantik,	Michael	
Devitt
Joško Žanić
Sur la solubilité du différend entre réalisme 
et constructivisme en ontologie
résumé
Dans	 l’introduction	 l’article	présente,	 basé	 sur	 l’œuvre	de	Michael	Devitt,	 les	positions	on-
tologiques	opposantes,	réalisme	et	constructivisme.	l’un	insiste	que	la	nature	du	monde	soit	
indépendante	de	notre	appareil	conceptuel,	du	langage	ou	des	théories	scientifiques,	tandis	que	
l’autre	affirme	qu’elle	en	soit	dépendante.	la	portion	centrale	de	l’article	essaie	de	montrer	que	
le	différend	entre	réalisme	et	constructivisme	est	insoluble,	au	moyen	d’une	expérience	de	pen-
sée	suivi	par	la	réfutation	des	arguments	des	constructivistes	(Kant,	Goodman)	et	des	réalistes	
(Devitt,	Boghossian)	les	plus	importants.	les	vues	de	Hilary	Putnam	sont	pareillement	briève-
ment	examinées	et	rejetées.	En	conclusion	on	soutient,	se	référant	partiellement	aux	arguments	
de	Carnap,	que	le	différend	ne	peut	pas	être	résolu,	que	c’est	une	antinomie	à	la	Kant,	et	que	
être	un	réaliste	ou	un	constructiviste	est	par	conséquent	une	question	de	décision.	En	course	de	
l’article	une	vue	est	aussi	exprimée	sur	la	nature	de	la	philosophie.
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